This paper discusses the bene"ts of adding formal speci"cation in B to existing controller synthesis techniques, and some of the limitations of B for this area of application. Examples from case studies carried out in the`Object-oriented speci"cation of real-time and reactive systemsa (ROOS) project are given.
Introduction
A control algorithm for a discrete event system describes the reactions (control signals to actuators) issued in response to each input event (from sensors) which may be sent to the controller. Typically, this algorithm is represented as a "nite state machine (FSM) or as a statechart. In current practice, control algorithms are usually developed by hand, thus introducing possibilities for perhaps very expensive or life-threatening design faults.
The automatic synthesis of control algorithms has the potential to reduce errors in the development of discrete event control systems, and make the development process for such systems more systematic and hence assessable. The emphasis in development can therefore shift to earlier requirements analysis and elicitation phases, with bene"ts for the correctness and safety properties of such systems.
This paper describes work in a project, ROOS (EPSRC GR/K68783), which has established techniques for the systematic derivation of executable controllers from requirements statements. These techniques combine procedural controller synthesis (Sanchez, 1996) and the B formal method and toolset (Abrial, 1996) . Section 2 de"nes the steps used in the method, Section 3 describes the case studies which will be used to illustrate the approach, Section 4 describes how invariants may be used to select suitable structuring of controllers, Section 5 describes the approach taken for the semiautomated synthesis of control algorithms from requirements. Section 6 describes the generation of executable code from B speci"cations. Section 7 de"nes techniques for the formalisation of temporal system properties such as liveness, Section 8 gives a comparison with other work, and Section 9 the conclusions.
Reactive systems development using B
B (Abrial, 1996) is a model-based formal method which provides modules, known as machines, encapsulating data and operations on that data. Modules can be accessed from other modules via mechanisms such as INCLUDES, SEES, etc. There is extensive tool support for B provided by the B Toolkit (B Core, 1998) and Atelier B (Digilog, 1998) toolsets.
The following steps are taken to specify a controller for a discrete event system in B, described in terms of a set of actuators and sensors, and required reactions to events detected by the sensors, and invariants that the state of the system must satisfy (Lano & Kan, 1998): 1. Produce a data and control #ow diagram (DCFD) of the entire control system, showing all signals from sensors to the controller and all commands from the controller to actuators. 2. Produce component models * describing the events each device (sensor or actuator) generates or responds to. These models are expressed as state machines. 3. Formalise: (i) required reactions to events; (ii) safety properties/invariants. 4. Partition the DCFD where possible into a set of subordinate controllers which involve a subset of the sensors and actuators of the system. 5. Specify controllers in B: each input event e responded to by the controller has a corresponding operation which describes the complete response to e in each possible system mode. The controller speci"cations are synthesised using procedural controller synthesis or invariant-based synthesis, together with manual abstraction of states. The invariant of each controller expresses local control invariants for the particular collection of sensors and actuators that it manages. 6. Specify sensors/actuators in B: these speci"cations represent the controllers inferred knowledge about the physical system, on the basis of events it has received and produced. 7. Implement the controller using library components.
Procedural controller synthesis (Sanchez, 1996) or invariant-based synthesis is used to derive the implementation of control algorithms (ordering the actuator commands for each controller response). 8. Implement sensor/actuator speci"cations * these will eventually be linked to actual physical devices. 9. Specify and implement an &outer level' component which detects input events (e.g: by polling sensors, by extraction from message queues, etc.) and noti"es the controller that they have occurred.
Animation can be applied to the controller speci"cations to check that the speci"ed behaviour is actually what the user intends, and that it avoids hazardous scenarios.
Proof can be applied to speci"cations to check the internal correctness of machines and interfaces: i.e., that the invariants of the machines are maintained by their operations, and that operations are called only in situations where their preconditions hold. Proof can be applied between speci"cations and implementations to check that the implemented response behaviour meets the speci"cations (although proof of temporal properties is outside the scope of the B tools at present).
Case studies
Within the ROOS project several case studies have been carried out:
1. Gas burner ignition system (Lano, Bicarregui & Sanchez, 1996; Lano & Sanchez, 1997 ) 2. Production cell control systems (Lano & Dick, 1996; Lano & Kan, 1998) 3. Mine pump and alarm control system (Lano, Goldsack, Bicarregui & Kent, 1997) 4. Measure tank control system (Lano & Sanchez, 1999) 5. Pasteurisation plant control system (PRESTO, 1997) 6. Steam boiler control system (Abrial, Borger & Zangmaack, 1997; Ali, 1998) .
Extracts from the burner and measure tank case studies will be used to illustrate the method.
Measure tank case study
This system (Fig. 1 ) is described in (Lano & Sanchez, 1999) . The purpose of this system is to deliver a measured quantity of #uid through the exit valve. There are a large number of static and dynamic constraints on the operation of the system. For example, the feed valve and relief valves must be closed if the exit valve is open, in order that a precise quantity of #uid is delivered. Moreover, the system must react to failures in the feed or exit valves, or situations where the level of #uid becomes too high.
The feed and exit valves can fail in the open or closed states, and can undergo repair operations. Thus they have the dynamic behaviour shown in Fig. 2 There are 784 states for the unconstrained system (taking the product of the individual state machines of the components). The undecomposed DCFD of the system is given in Fig. 3. 
Gas burner
This system controls the valves and igniter of a simple gas burner (Fig. 4) . When the switch is pressed the controller should try to move the system into a state where the air valve is open, the gas valve is open, the #ame is ignited and the igniter is o!. If #ame appears while the switch is o!, the air valve should be opened. 
Structuring of controllers
Except for the most trivial systems, it is necessary to modularise the speci"cation of the control algorithm, in order to obtain analysable descriptions. There are several ways in which such a decomposition can be achieved:
Events e are dealt with "rst by an overseer controller S which handles certain interactions between components, and e (or derived events) are then sent to subordinate controllers responsible for managing the individual behaviour of subcomponents (Fig. 5 ). This design is appropriate if some control aspects can be managed at an aggregate level separately from control aspects, which can be managed at an individual component level. It can also be used to separate responsibility for dealing with certain subsidiary aspects of a control problem (such as fault detection) from the calculation of control responses.
Subordinate controllers S and S should control disjoint sets of actuators, or be independent on shared actuators in the sense that for any two command sequences a and a issued by S and S , respectively, to a shared actuator A, any permutation of a 6a has the same state-transformation e!ect on A as a 6a . The timing of the responses of S and S relative to each other must also not be critical. 2. Horizontal composition of controllers: Events are copied to two separate control algorithms S and S , which compute their reactions independently (Fig. 6 ). As with hierarchical composition, S and S should control disjoint sets of actuators, or be independent on shared actuators. 3. Decomposition by control mode: A separate controller is speci"ed for the control reactions to be carried out in each mode or phase of the system (International Society for Measurement and Control, 1995) . An overseer controller coordinates the switching between controllers when the mode changes.
The "rst two are based on the physical decomposition of the actual system, whilst the third is based on temporal decomposition.
The design pattern Chain of Responsibility (Gamma, Helm, Johnoon & Vlissider, 1994 ) is particularly relevant to the "rst approach, whilst the design pattern State is relevant as a means of implementing the third approach. Ali (1998) uses Chain of Responsibility in the speci"cation of the steam boiler control system to separate the detection of transmission errors from the detection of input data errors and the processing of valid events, in a three-layer hierarchical control architecture.
The invariants of a reactive system can be used to select suitable controller decompositions, as follows.
Fault detection: If there is an invariant I on a group of sensor states only, then this represents an assumption about the normal state of the environment. Fault-detection tests can be used to check if this fails to hold, and raise an exception or force a change of mode to a faulthandling mode. These should be in fault-detection layers that are wrapped around (hierarchically above) the main controller.
Horizontal decomposition: If there are disjoint sets A, B of actuators and no invariants relate the state of any actuator in A to the state of any in B, then A and B can be controlled independently by horizontal decomposition.
Hierarchical decomposition: Conversely, if there is some invariant linking the states of sets A of actuators and S of sensors, then there must be some supervisor controller which manages (directly or indirectly) each of these actuators, in order to ensure the invariant, and which has a response de"ned for all of the events generated from the sensors in S.
Subordinate controllers: If there are invariants which link a proper subset of the actuators, then this suggests the creation of a subordinate controller which manages this set. This is particularly so if the states are completely linked, i.e., the value of one actuator state is a function of one or more others.
These guidelines have been applied in the case studies of the steam boiler, which used fault-detection layers and vertical composition, and the production cell, which used horizontal and vertical composition.
Synthesis of control algorithms
Two techniques for the construction of control algorithms from requirements speci"cations can be used:
1. Procedural controller synthesis (Sanchez, 1996) , which is suitable if there are comprehensive requirements on system reactions. 2. Invariant-based synthesis, which is suitable if there are comprehensive invariants for system behaviour.
Procedural controller synthesis
Procedural control theory (PCT) (Sanchez, 1996) identi"es how to synthesise a procedural controller for a process on the basis of (i) models of the individual process components as state machines; (ii) static constraints or invariants that must be satis"ed by all states of the controller; (iii) procedural obligations which require particular reactions to input events; (iv) dynamic constraints which specify liveness and ordering obligations which must be obeyed by the synthesised controller.
Two key components of PCT are the notions of procedural controller and controllability. A procedural controller is a mathematical representation which describes the behaviour the process must ful"l in order to reach desired goal states in a safe manner without reaching forbidden situations. A procedural controller is represented by an FSM in which each state either has: (i) a unique transition leaving it, representing an output from the controller to the controlled system, i.e. a control command; or (ii) transitions modelling process responses that can be issued in the current process state. PCT gives su$cient conditions of existence for a procedural controller ful"lling safety properties. That is, if a procedural controller exists for a given speci"cation, it can be guaranteed that the process behaviour will be kept within desired boundaries by the controller, avoiding any hazardous or unsafe operation by issuing control commands.
The generated controller is represented as a state machine in which the reactions of the control system to input events are de"ned in terms of the sequence of control signals that are sent to the actuators.
For the measure tank case study there are 101 states in the procedural controller, which is therefore di$cult to understand and validate. A (manual) abstraction process can be applied to this control algorithm to identify high-level abstract states, which collect together a number of low-level states on the basis of common behaviour. The formal meaning of these states are then expressed as invariants in the B machine specifying the controller: 
For example, the xlling mode collects together all states in which the relief and exit valves are closed and the level is either minimum or normal.
Operations of this machine describe the controllers reaction to input events. For example:
The complete response is given as a change in the states of one or more components of the system. The sequence of atomic operation steps is not described, instead thè parallel substitutiona S ""S statement is used to assert that both changes S and S happen (independently). Ordering these changes is deferred until the implementation of this machine.
Controller synthesis from invariants
An alternative to procedural controller synthesis is to use the invariants for controller behaviour, both operational and safety, to synthesise the required control algorithm, ie, the reaction to individual events.
A typical operational invariant will have the form:
where sstate is some sensor state, G a guard involving other sensor or actuator states, and astate is an actuator state. This represents an obligation that the actuator must be on if an associated switch or trigger sensor is in state s1 and a guard is satis"ed. Then the reaction to any event that sets sstate to s1 while G is true must set astate to be on. Also, any event which results in G becoming true whilst sstate"s1 must also have a reaction which sets astate"on.
A safety invariant will often have the converse form, i.e:
astate"onNG sstate"s1
stating that the actuator is only activated when it is required and it is safe to operate. This means that the reaction to any event that sets sstateOs1 or that invalidates G must set astate o! if it is not already o!.
More precisely, the algorithm for synthesising an abstract B speci"cation from the invariants is as follows: E For each event e (that a!ects the state of a particular sensor, for example setting sstate to s1):
1. Identify all invariants which may be invalidated by this state change i.e., invariants of the form sstate"s1 G1Nastate"a1 sstate"s1 G2Nastate"a2 2. Identify actuator changes needed to maintain these invariants * gather together in a single conditional clause all cases of changes to a particular actuator:
All possible cases should be de"ned in the invariants * for missing cases additional invariants will have to be provided by the developer. These then give rise to a hierarchically organised set of conditional clauses, with the most general conditions in the outer conditional tests and more speci"c subcases in the inner tests.
Optionally, assignments to actuator states can be replaced by invocations of corresponding operations of a machine which encapsulates the actuator state. 3. Compose changes to di!erent actuators by "". 4. Restructure the operation de"nition if necessary to move all occurrences of "" inside conditional branches, so that no "" combinator occurs outside an IF statement.
Consider the gas burner system's operational invariants given in Section 3. Together they can be used to generate a complete control algorithm speci"cation. Fig. 7 gives the derived algorithm for this system, where the initial state of the system is (ow, absent, closed, closed, ow) , and component states are ordered as (swstate, fdstate, avstate, gvstate, istate) . The numbers of the axioms which give the e!ect of each transition are shown beside it. The B code of the operations switch } on and yame } disappears operations derived from Fig. 7 is given in Fig. 8 . The requirements statement axioms can also be used to derive the orderings of individual actuator commands within each control reaction. The safety constraint gvstate"openNavstate"open means that the air valve must be opened before the gas valve, in reactions where both are opened. In reactions where both are closed, the gas valve must be closed "rst.
The operational constraint istate"onNgvstate" open means that the gas valve must be opened before the igniter is switched on, in reactions that set both actuators on. In reactions that set both o!, the igniter must be switched o! "rst.
In some cases, a number of possibilities for the ordering of actuator commands within control reactions will remain after such analysis. The designer must then make some selection of an admissible ordering.
A safety invariant of the form astate"xNsstate"s can be rewritten as the logically equivalent sstateOsNastateOx which can be treated in the same way as the operational invariants described above: any event that results in sstate leaving state s must also ensure astateOx (if there is more than one possibility for the new value of astate, then the designer must specify a value). An invariant of the form
Re5nement and implementation
The implementation of controller speci"cations in B is a direct process. The conditional structure of each speci-"cation operation e is retained in the implementation of e, but calls to actuator operations are carried out in particular orders. For example in the measure tank system, switch } turned } on is implemented as:
Because of this continuity in structure, this implementation can be automatically proved correct.
The implementation also de"nes how the real-world events of the switch being pressed, the level changing, etc., are communicated to the controller. In B, one possible approach is a form of polling, where each polling cycle 1. obtains the most recent values of the controllers record of the states of each component, then 2. obtains the actual sensed current values of the states, 3. compares the current and previous values, and then 4. calls appropriate controller actions to handle any events which are deduced to have occurred on the basis of di!erences between these values.
Formalising temporal requirements properties
Static constraints on the state of a controlled system can be directly expressed as B invariants of controllers, however dynamic temporal constraints can only be indirectly expressed. Instead, linear temporal logic (Fiadeiro & Maibaum, 1991) can be used to directly express such constraints. For example, a permission constraint in the level tank system is
min2norm, norm2high and high2max cannot occur if fvstate"fv } closed or fvstate"fv } openinga. This represents a physical constraint that can be assumed, rather than a property that the controller must enforce. It is therefore expressed in B by including fvstateO fv } closed fvstateOfv } opening in the precondition PRE of the operations min2norm, norm2high and high2max.
An eventuality constraint that is needed to show the overall system goal that the discharge through the exit valve always corresponds to the di!erence between the minimum and normal levels is
Once the exit valve is opened with the level at normal, it is not closed again until the level becomes minimuma.
U is the weak until operator. This constraint is veri"ed by adding a new variable until } yag:BOOL to the controller, which is set to FALSE initially, and set to TRUE whenever the condition level"normal evstate" ev } opening becomes true. For example:
"emptying ELSE /* shutdown"TRUE, level"minimum */ complete } close } fv # cstate :
The #ag is set to FALSE once the minimum level is reached.
The U constraint is then formalised by the invariant until } -ag"¹R;ENevstateOev } closed An example liveness constraint is:
cstate",llingN᭛ (cstateO,lling) The "lling process must terminatea. This is veri"ed by de"ning a variant function var of the controller state so that, whenever the system is in the xlling state, each action of the controller decreases var by at least 1. var"0 will occur once the target state cstateO,lling has been achieved. There is no direct tool support in B for de"ning or verifying a variant function, although there are indirect means of veri"cation, using re"nement.
There are 370 proof obligations for the HL } Controller machine, over 250 of which are automatically proved, and the remainder can be interactively proved with a small (under 2 h) e!ort.
Related work
B has been used successfully within the French railway industry since 1989 for the speci"cation and veri"cation of train control and protection software (Mejia, 1998) . A similar approach for controller speci"cation is used in this area of application: controller operations correspond to events that the control system responds to. However no guidelines are provided for general structuring choices for controllers or on the automated derivation of control code from requirements.
The paper (Draper & Treharne, 1996) de"nes an alternative approach for using B to specify and implement reactive systems. The approach combines formal methods (B-method) and current methods (Ada) to develop safety critical avionics software development.
The approach starts from a set of informal requirements, from which an abstract speci"cation can be produced by hand, written in B notation. Two routes can then be taken, in parallel, which consist of the following tasks: (a) Main route: takes the speci"cation and re"nes it through several steps. The steps consist of a subset of "ve di!erent re"nement styles, ending with a decomposed, structured design. Only the software operations are then translated, by hand, into Ada. (b) Prototype route: which produces executable code from the abstract speci"cation, using the code generator feature of the B-Toolkit. the executable implementation is then used to generate test cases to verify the Ada code against the abstract speci-"cation. A speci"cation is structured and designed primarily through "ve types of re"nement styles. These being:
1. Structural re"nement * partitioning of the top-level design. 2. Data re"nement * replacement of abstract states with concrete states, mainly by IMPORTing library machines. 3. Operational re"nement * replacement of abstract operations with concrete operations. For example, introduction of sequential composition and loops, aided by library machines. 4. Detail re"nement * expansion of abstract state variables and operations. 5. Type re"nement * detail re"nement of types and constants, placed in a separate abstract machine.
A speci"cation is often initially re"ned structurally, and the smaller speci"cations resulting from the structural re"nement are then subjected to a detailed, data or operational re"nement.
However, guidelines on which re"nement style to use in particular cases are not given. In addition, at each step of structural re"nement, it is possible that the speci"cation can produce further layerings of combined functions (and machines). Therefore, the "nal compositional structure of the system will only become clear once all the re"nement steps have been completed. In contrast, the B approach given in this paper develops the overall compositional structure of the system prior to re"nement, based on the physical or temporal structures of the equipment under control. The re"nement process merely transforms the abstract data and operations into concrete data and operations.
Another related approach is the speci"cation (BuK ssow & Weber, 1997) of the steam boiler using a combination of the speci"cation language Z and state-charts. An object-oriented modelling paradigm is adopted, where the embedded control system is seen as a hierarchically structured collection of objects that change state and interact with each other. However there is limited decomposition of the control system, and no direct mapping from the logical structure of the system to the decomposition of the control algorithm.
Conclusions
The case studies have demonstrated the capabilities of the B language and tools for specifying, verifying and implementing reactive systems, despite the restricted nature of this language. In particular the following bene"ts have been identi"ed: E A formal speci"cation can de"ne abstract controller states (modes) and behaviour, via system invariants that characterise these states. These states can be veri-"ed using proof obligations and tool support for proofs, and are at a suitable level of abstraction for operator understanding and maintenance. E The speci"ed controller may satisfy additional invariants, stronger than the static constraints imposed on the controller superstructure (the maximal statetransition model which satis"es the static requirements). Verifying these invariants can be e$ciently achieved using the tool support for B. These invariants may imply important operational properties not considered in the initial requirements. For example, in the measure tank case study, the feed valve cannot be normally open if the water level is at or above the normal level. E The formal method can help in the discovery of variants * natural number expressions that are strictly decreased by each action along a path starting from a given state. This can support proofs that certain states are eventually achieved.
E The formal method supports animation and validation at an early development stage. E The executable implementation produced by B can be a useful alternative to simulations such as gPROMS (Barton, Smith & Pantelides, 1991) as a prototype or simulation of the system, and addresses how realworld events are detected and communicated to the control system.
In general, rigorous analysis of a system using a formal method such as B enables design errors and unintended behaviour to be identi"ed at an early stage of development, thus enhancing the quality of the "nal system. However several areas need further work:
1. Abstraction: The B speci"cations used are already at quite a detailed design level, where the events to which the system will react, and its physical components, have already been determined. Thus any correctness and safety arguments can only be carried out between the discretised system model and the source code of the controller. In contrast, it would be useful to be able to specify at a very high level of abstraction, using the formal notation to represent and reason about the continuous physical model of the controlled system. This would enable correctness arguments to be carried through the entire development process to the source code. 2. Temporal constraints: High-level temporal constraints cannot be directly represented in B, instead they must be encoded using #ags, variants, or other indirect mechanisms.
The extension of B to cover temporal logic speci"cation of dynamic behaviour, timing and deadlines of periodic actions, and the veri"cation of implementations against temporal speci"cations would be of assistance in developing reactive systems in the chemical process domain. Additionally, more e!ective ways of expressing and verifying variants should be added to the language and tools, as proposed in Abrial and Mussat (1998) .
Tools are under development to assist control engineers in: de"ning DCFD and statechart models of a control system; decomposing the DCFD into sub-processes (controllers); synthesising control algorithms; and automatically translating controllers into B speci"cations and corresponding implementations.
